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ARTICLES
SECTION 605 OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT:
TEACHING A SALTY OLD SEA DOG NEW
TRICKS
Richard L. Brown*
and Lauritz S. Helland **
For over fifty years, section 605 of the Communications Act' has stood,
with considerable judicial assistance, as a stalwart sentinel defending the se-
crecy of many communications transmitted via the public spectrum. Then,
in 1984, as if in direct defiance of Orwellian predictions, Congress lifted the
shroud of secrecy by proclaiming that satellite cable programming was not
protected by section 605 from viewing by home satellite earth station con-
sumers. In so acting, Congress created a "safe harbor" within which con-
sumers, using satellite earth stations to view unscrambled satellite cable
programming in the privacy of their homes, would be freed from charges
that they were "pirates," using their earth stations to obtain booty in viola-
tion of federal law.
The safe harbor that was created stands as a snug haven offering protec-
tion from the stormy seas created by expansionist judicial interpretations of
section 605. The safe harbor manifests congressional recognition of the
political reality of the rapid growth of home earth stations among consumers
all over the nation. But, rather than resolving all problems that have devel-
oped under this ancient statute, the safe harbor has provided but one port in
a storm. Periodic squalls will inevitably continue as earth station users, as
well as others, continue to test the meaning and effect of this old and enig-
matic statute.
* Senior Partner, Brown & Finn, chartered. B.A. 1966, Emory University; J.D. 1969,
New York University.
* Associate, Brown & Finn, chartered. B.A. 1970, University of Washington; J.D.
1973, University of Washington.
1. The Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 605, 48 Stat. 1103 (1934)
(codified at 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1982)).
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I. HISTORY OF HOME SATELLITE EARTH STATIONS
Five years ago, consumer use of satellite earth stations (often simply called
satellite dishes) and the industry spawned by such use, did not exist. Today,
more than one million consumer-owned satellite dish antennas have been
installed at homes in all parts of the United States2 enabling earth station
owners to have direct access to a rich variety of information, entertainment,
cultural and educational programming transmitted by satellite. Many of
these consumers traditionally have been unserved or underserved by conven-
tional broadcast or cable television services. Deregulation by the Federal
Communications Commission, which removed licensing and size restrictions
of dish antennas,3 coupled with technological developments in the late
1970's making possible the construction of relatively inexpensive but reliable
earth stations, led to a proliferation in the use of such satellite dish anten-
nas.4 This proliferation occurred first in rural areas5 and then, as the benefit
of direct access to satellite transmissions became more widely known, in
more populated parts of the country.
These developments were not welcomed by some within the telecommuni-
cations establishment. Satellite program distributors, whose principal cus-
tomers were cable television systems, initially adopted a position that the
sale and use of earth station equipment to view their programming without
permission infringed copyrights and violated section 605.6 At the same time,
most satellite programmers established policies refusing to authorize viewing
by consumer dish owners.7 Local franchised cable television systems viewed
earth station dealers and their customers as "pirates." One cable system in
Wichita, Kansas, sued an earth station retailer, Starlink Communications
Group, Inc., for ten million dollars, claiming that the dealer's sales of earth
stations to consumers violated section 605 and the Copyright Act.'
Despite this opposition, the home earth station market continued to grow.
2. 131 CONG. REC. S1216 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1985) (statement of Sen. Goldwater).
3. Deregulation of Receive-only Earth Stations, 74 F.C.C.2d 204 (1979).
4. Unauthorized Reception of Subscription Television: Hearings on S. 66 Before the Sub-
comm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Finance of the Senate Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 106 (statement of Richard L. Brown, Partner,
Brown & Finn.) [hereinafter cited as Unauthorized Reception].
5. Id. at 8 (statement of Hon. Charles Rose).
6. See, e.g., Letters from HBO to Don Linn and National Microtech, reprinted in Unau-
thorized Reception, supra note 4, at 127-29.
7. Id. at 121-46.
8. Air Capital Cablevision, Inc. v. Starlink Communications Group, 601 F. Supp. 1568
(D. Kan. 1985). Shortly after the action was filed, the cable system voluntarily dismissed its
Copyright Act claims. On Feb. 13, 1985, the district court ruled that the cable system had no
standing to pursue its Communications Act claims, and that the earth station retailer did not
violate former § 605 or new § 705 of the Act. Id.
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By 1984, 60,000 earth stations were being sold to consumers nationwide
each month.9 Threatened by the Starlink case and by several legislative at-
tempts between 1980 and 1984 to, in effect, outlaw home satellite earth sta-
tion use, the industry sought congressional relief.
II. THE SAFE HARBOR
Relief came through enactment of the Cable Communications Policy Act
of 1984.'° Section 5 of the Act evidences a congressional recognition of the
legality and legitimacy of home satellite earth stations." In addition, the
Act is a forceful congressional response to attempts to use the Communica-
tions Act's secrecy provision to prevent the continued development of the
industry. 12
The new law redesignates section 605 of the Communications Act as sec-
tion 705(a) and adds a new section 705(b) specifically to exclude from sec-
tion 705(a) the "interception or receipt by any individual" of "any satellite
cable programming for private viewing if the programming involved is not
encrypted [scrambled]" and if a "marketing system" for nonencrypted pro-
gramming has not been established.13 If a "marketing system" is estab-
lished, it takes precedence over the safe harbor.14
"Satellite cable programming" is defined by section 705(c)(1) as "video
programming which is transmitted via satellite and which is primarily in-
tended for the direct receipt by cable operators for their retransmission to
cable subscribers." 15 "Private viewing" is not defined, but the legislative his-
tory associated with the 1984 Act reveals that the term "is intended to de-
scribe a situation whereby an individual purchases or otherwise acquires
satellite receiving equipment and uses such equipment to receive satellite
cable programming which he views within his private dwelling place."16
The term "marketing system" is likewise not defined. The legislative history
reveals, however, that the provision's drafters contemplated a marketing
plan developed by "good faith marketplace negotiation" between representa-
9. See supra note 2.
10. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (1984)
(codified at 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 521-611 (West Supp. 1985)).
11. 130 CONG. REC. S14283-85 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984) (statement of Sen. Goldwater).
12. Id.; see also 130 CONG. REC. H10443 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984) (statement of Rep.
Gore); 130 CONG. REC. H10446 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984) (statement of Rep. Rose).
13. Cable Communications Policy Act, supra note 10, at § 5(b) (to be codified at 47
U.S.C. § 705(b)).
14. Id.
15. Cable Communications Policy Act, supra note 10, at § 5(c) (to be codified at 47
U.S.C. § 705(c)).
16. 130 CONG. REC. S14288 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984) (statement of Sen. Packwood).
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tives of programmers and viewers.17 Such a "marketing system" for un-
scrambled signals may not be imposed unilaterally, nor employed as a means
to deny viewers access to satellite programming.18 The burden of establish-
ing such a system rests with those who control the satellite programming.
19
Unless a marketing system meeting the requisites of the Act is established,
exposure to liability under section 705(a) for individual receptions of un-
scrambled satellite cable programming will not occur.2"
As noted, section 705(b) protects only "individual" receptions of satellite
cable programming for "private viewing."21 Commercial uses of satellite
earth sations are not protected by the new provision, but are relegated to the
murky seas of the rechristened section 705(a).
By adopting a safe harbor approach, Congress has recognized and legiti-
mized the recent rapid proliferation in the use of consumer-owned satellite
dish antennas to receive most existing television transmissions from commu-
nications satellites. At the same time, Congress has for the first time im-
posed specific criminal penalties on persons found to have violated the
provision. Section 705(d)(1) provides that any person willfully violating sec-
tion 705(a) "shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not more
than six months, or both."22 Section 705(d)(2) states that any person violat-
ing section 705(a) "willfully and for purposes of direct or indirect commer-
cial advantage or private gain" shall be fined "not more than $25,000 or
imprisoned for not more than one year" for first convictions, and "not more
than $50,000 or imprisoned not more than two years" for subsequent
convictions.23
17. 130 CONG. REC. S14284 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984) (statement of Sen. Goldwater); see
also 130 CONG. REC. H10446 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984) (statement of Rep. Rose); 130 CONG.
REC. H10443 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984) (statement of Rep. Gore).
18. 130 CONG. REC. S14284 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984) (statement of Sen. Goldwater).
19. 130 CONG. REC. S14287 (Oct. 11, 1984).
20. Id.
21. See supra note 16.
22. See Cable Communications Policy Act, supra note 10, at § 5(d)(1) (to be codified at 47
U.S.C. § 705(d)(1)).
23. See Cable Communications Policy Act, supra note 10, at § 5(d)(2) (to be codified at 47
U.S.C. § 705(d)(2)). Some concern has been expressed that penalties for violations of the stat-
ute may be much higher. On Oct. 12, 1984, the new Comprehensive Crime Control Act of
1982, Pub. L. No. 98-473, became law. 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (1982) of that Act states that
"[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided, a defendant who has been found guilty of an of-
fense described in any Federal statute" shall be sentenced to probations, fines and imprison-
ments as provided elsewhere in the Act. 18 U.S.C. § 3571 (1982) authorizes fines as high as
$250,000 for individuals and $500,000 for organizations. While the sentencing provisions of
the Crime Control Act would appear to apply by their general terms to violations of § 705(a),
it is a well established rule of statutory construction that where one statute deals with a subject
in general terms and another deals with it in a more specific way, the more specific statute will
control. Preiser v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973); Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco &
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The creation of the safe harbor and the addition of criminal sanctions for
violations of section 705 will likely give the statute new significance as courts
begin to wrestle with issues presented by the rapid emergence of the new
communications technologies. As the courts begin to address these issues,
problems in interpreting and applying the statute-problems created in large
part because of its enigmatic language and limited legislative history, aug-
mented by varying judicial attempts, mostly by lower courts, to decipher its
meaning and purpose-could intensify until higher courts, or Congress, are
forced to reexamine the entire concept of secrecy in mass communications.
Short of such a reexamination, the statute can be interpreted and applied
in a manner that is consistent with both the discernible purpose of its draft-
ers and the concerns voiced by courts construing its terms. Such an inter-
pretation would find liability only when communications have been
"intercepted and divulged" or "received and used" without permission from
their senders after reasonable efforts have been made by the senders to safe-
guard them from such interception or reception. This interpretation should
assist senders of communications in their reasonable attempts to protect
their transmissions from unauthorized and unwarranted intrusions, but not
to the point of penalizing persons who receive transmissions that are attrac-
tive, easy to receive and technically unprotected from mass reception. The
interpretation would facilitate the statute's principal objective of safeguard-
ing the means of transmission while discouraging its use as an ersatz "copy-
right" law by those seeking to protect interests in communications too
limited to warrant protection under the Copyright Law. To understand why
the suggested interpretation is consistent with the purpose and evolution of
section 705(a), a review of its legislative and judicial history is appropriate.
A. Legislative History
The first thing revealed by an examination of section 705(a)'s legislative
history is that it does not shed much light upon the statute's meaning or
purpose. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia has
noted that the history is "of minimal help in clarifying the ambiguity that
Firearms, 670 F.2d 1051 (1981). See 2 A. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 51.05
(4th ed. 1973). This rule is particularly applicable to criminal statutes in which specific provi-
sions relating to particular subjects carry smaller penalties than general provisions. Robinson
v. United States, 142 F.2d 431 (8th Cir. 1944). Applying this principal, the Supreme Court has
held that general sentencing statutes could not be applied to more specific criminal statutes
with their own sentencing provisions. Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398 (1980); Simpson v.
United States, 435 U.S. 6 (1978). Because § 705(d) imposes specific penalties for violations of
§ 705(a), the more general penalties set forth in the Crime Control Act would not appear to
apply.
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plagues [its] meaning .. . ."24 A California District Court agreed, noting
that "the legislative history surrounding [the statute] is uncertain and we are
precluded from utilizing the usual canon that the scope of a provision is
determined by its purpose."2 5 Nonetheless, some facts can be adduced from
a review of the statute's history.
The statute was drafted in response to the International Wireless Tele-
graph Convention, which was executed by the United States and other na-
tions at Berlin on November 3, 1906 (the Berlin Convention) and ratified by
the United States Senate on April 3, 1912.26 The principal objective of the
Convention was to establish international standards for the regulation of
ship-to-shore wireless telegraphic communications and to establish networks
of coastal stations connected to the established line telegraph systems.27 The
service regulations adopted with the Convention required shipboard stations
to be licensed by the government with which the vessel was registered.28
These regulations required shipboard operators to hold government certifi-
cates attesting to their professional efficiency and stating "that the Govern-
ment has bound the operator to secrecy with regard to the
correspondence."
29
1. Radio Act of 1912
A bill to regulate radio communication, drafted jointly by the former De-
partment of Commerce and Labor, the War Department, the Department of
the Navy and the Department of the Treasury was initially introduced and
passed in the Senate in 1910.30 A similar bill, although favorably reported,
did not pass the House of Representatives.3 1
These bills were reintroduced in substantially identical form in both
houses in 1911 and were referred to the Senate Commerce Committee and
the House Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries, where hear-
ings were scheduled in early 1912.32 The House bill included a regulation to
protect the secrecy of messages: "Every operator shall be obligated in his
24. Reston v. FCC, 492 F. Supp. 697, 706 (D.D.C. 1980).
25. National Subscription Television v. S & H TV, No. CV 80-829-LTL (C.D. Cal. Aug.
4, 1980).
26. International Wireless Telegraph Convention, Nov. 3, 1906; 37 Stat. 1565 (1912).
27. 37 Stat. at 1565-66.
28. Convention, Serv. Reg. VI, 1; 37 Stat. at 1583.
29. Id. at 4; 37 Stat. at 1584.
30. S. REP. No. 698, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1912); To Regulate Radio Communications:
Hearings on H.R. 15,357 Before the House Comm. on the Merchant Marine & Fisheries, 62d
Cong., 2d Sess. 5, 124 (1912).
31. S. REP. No. 698, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1912).
32. Id. at 2-3.
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license, and shall preserve faithfully, the secrecy of radiograms which he
may receive or transmit, and for failure to preserve such secrecy his license
may be canceled." 33 The House committee explained the reason for the reg-
ulation in its report: "Secrecy of messages. This is required by the Berlin
convention and has been urged by commercial concerns at hearings before
committees of Congress." 34 It should be noted that, as originally drafted,
this provision applied only to licensed operators. The narrow objective the
drafters sought to achieve can be discerned from the Senate report accompa-
nying the legislation: "The bill does not interfere in any way with the hear-
ing of messages by amateurs at all times and places as they may elect."35
As finally enacted, Regulation 19, expanded to include persons "having
knowledge of" as well as those "engaged in" the operations of a station, was
embodied as part of section 4 of the Radio Act of 1912:
No person or persons engaged in or having knowledge of the
operation of any station or stations, shall divulge or publish the
contents of any messages transmitted or received by such station,
except to the person or persons to whom the same may be directed,
or their authorized agent, or to another station employed to for-
ward such message to its destination, unless legally required so to
do by the court of competent jurisdiction or other competent au-
thority. Any person guilty of divulging or publishing any message,
except as herein provided, shall, on conviction thereof, be punish-
able by a fine of not more than two hundred and fifty dollars or
imprisonment for a period of not exceeding three months, or both
fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.36
While Regulation 19 penalized the publication or disclosure of private
(principally ship-to-shore) transmissions by station operators or persons hav-
ing knowledge of station operations, it expressly refrained from imposing
any restriction or control on the mere reception of wireless signals by any
person possessing the requisite equipment.37
2. Radio Act of 1927
When Congress passed the 1912 Act, radio communication consisted al-
33. H.R. REP. No. 582, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1912).
34. Id. at 16. The drafters had originally considered controlling the confidentiality of
messages by licensing all receivers. This suggestion was opposed by industry representatives
and was dropped after committee hearings. See Bills to Regulate Radio Communication:
Hearings on S. 3620 & S. 5334 Before the Subcomm. of the Sen. Comm on Commerce, 62d
Cong., 2d Sess. 22-25 (1912).
35. S. REP. No. 698, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1912).
36. Radio Act of 1912, Pub. L. No. 62-264, § 4, 37 Stat. 302, 307 (1912).
37. Id.
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most exclusively of wireless telegraphy and its use in transmitting messages
between coastal stations and ships at sea. "Broadcasting" as we know it
today was unknown and was not even contemplated. The growth of experi-
mental and amateur use of the radio spectrum was rapid, however, and the
Secretary of Commerce began to issue licenses to prevent interference be-
tween such use and commercial telegraphy." In the early 1920's, licensed
stations began to transmit news and entertainment programming intended
for reception by the general public. By 1926, in addition to the thousands of
amateur, ship, point-to-point and transoceanic transmitting stations, there
were 536 broadcasting stations in the United States39 transmitting to an esti-
mated 15,000,000 receiving sets.4° It was estimated that in 1925 alone,
$450,000,000 was expended for radio equipment in the United States.
4 1
By this time, there was a consensus that revision of the 1912 Act was
necessary, but there was no consensus regarding what role the federal gov-
ernment should play in radio regulation. It was undecided whether monop-
olistic and inticompetitive practices by companies such as RCA and
General Electric had occurred or should be tolerated and whether a broad-
casting license should vest its holder with any recognizable property inter-
est.4 2 Legislation addressing these issues was introduced, but not passed in
the 67th and 68th Congresses.43
Legislation to broaden the 1912 Act was introduced in both houses of
Congress in 1926 and a conference bill was enacted on February 23, 1927, as
the Radio Act of 1927." The secrecy provision of the 1912 Act was embod-
ied as section 27:
No person receiving or assisting in receiving any radio commu-
nication shall divulge or publish the contents, substance, purport,
effect, or meaning thereof except through authorized channels of
transmission or reception to any person other than the addressee,
his agent, or attorney, or to a telephone, telegraph, cable or radio
station employed or authorized to forward such radio communica-
tion to its destination, or to proper accounting or distributing of-
ficers of the various communicating centers over which the radio
communication may be passed, or to the master of a ship under
whom he is serving, or in response to a subpoena issued by a court
of competent jurisdiction, or on demand of other lawful authority;
38. S. REP. No. 772, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1926).
39. H.R. REP. No. 404, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1926).
40. 68 CONG. REC. 4109 (1927).
41. H.R. REP. No. 404, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1926).
42. Id. at 6-32.
43. Id. at 6-7, 14-16.
44. Pub. L. No. 69-632, §§ 1-41, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927).
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and no person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept
any message and divulge or publish the contents, substance, pur-
port, effect, or meaning of such intercepted message to any person;
and no person not being entitled thereto shall receive or assist in
receiving any radio communication and use the same or any infor-
mation therein contained for his own benefit or for the benefit of
another not entitled thereto; and no person having received such
intercepted radio communication or having become acquainted
with the contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the
same or any part thereof, knowing that such information was so
obtained, shall divulge or publish the contents, substance, purport,
effect, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or use the same
or any information therein contained for his own benefit or for the
benefit of another not entitled thereto: Provided, That this section
shall not apply to the receiving, divulging, publishing, or utilizing
the contents of any radio communication broadcasted or transmit-
ted by amateurs or others for the use of the general public or relat-
ing to ships in distress.45
Because the drafters believed the section to be primarily a redraft of ex-
isting law,46 they did not attempt to explain the significant modifications
that appeared for the first time in the section.
For example, the statute was now comprised of four independent clauses,
each proscribing subtly different activities:
1. The first clause prohibited persons "receiving or assisting in
receiving any radio communication" from "divulg[ing]" or "pub-
lish[ing]" its contents except through designated authorized chan-
nels to authorized receivers;
2. The second clause prohibited persons "not being authorized
by the sender" from "intercept[ing]" any message and
"divulg[ing]" or "publish[ing]" its contents to any person;
3. The third clause prohibited persons "not being entitled
thereto" from "receiv[ing] or assist[ing] in receiving any radio
communication" and "us[ing] the same or any information therein
contained for his own benefit or for the benefit of another not enti-
tled thereto";
45. 44 Stat. at 1172.
46. S. REP. No. 772, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1926) states: "The provisions regarding the
protection of ship signals and messages against reception and use by unauthorized persons are
largely a redraft of existing law and seem necessary and proper provisions." Similarly, H.R.
REP. No. 404, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1926) states: "The bill also seeks to protect messages
and the contents thereof against reception and use by unauthorized persons. The section is a
redraft of a provision of existing law. It seems to the committee a proper and a necessary
provision."
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4. The fourth clause prohibited persons "having received such
intercepted radio communication or having become acquainted
with [its] contents" from divulging or publishing its contents or
using it or its substance for his own benefit or for the benefit of
another not entitled thereto.47
Nothing in the legislative history of the 1927 Act explains the purpose or
meaning of the separate clauses. Similarly, no explanation is given for a new
proviso inserted to exempt communications "broadcasted or transmitted by
amateurs or others for the use of the general public or relating to ships in
distress.",48 Its language is similar to a clause contained in the secrecy provi-
sion of a 1924 House bill, which provided that it would "not apply to the
receiving, divulging, publishing or utilizing the contents of any radio conver-
sation transmitted for the use of the general public or relating to ships in
distress."49 A Senate bill introduced the same year contained a similar
clause.5° Neither bill was enacted. Similar language appeared in a 1925
House bill that, likewise, was not enacted.51 While no legislative history
associated with the 1927 Act or these earlier bills reveals the purpose of or
the policy behind the proviso, the reference in Senate Report 772 to section
27 as "the provisions regarding the protection of ship signals and
messages"" may have reflected an intention to continue to limit the con-
straints upon "divulgence" or "use" to communications similar in form and
usage to the wireless telegraphy protected by the i912 Act.
3. Communications Act of 1934
The Communications Act of 1934 was enacted on June 19, 1934.13 One of
the principal purposes of the Act was to consolidate jurisdiction over wire
and radio communications in a new Federal Communications Commis-
sion.54 Previously, jurisdiction had been exercised by four different entities:
the Federal Radio Commission; the Department of Commerce; the Post Of-
fice; and the Interstate Commerce Commission.55 Much of the Act, includ-
ing most provisions in title III (covering radio broadcasting), is a redraft of
47. Radio Act of 1927, supra note 44, at § 27, 44 Stat. at 1172.
48. Id.
49. H.R. 7357, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. § 12 (1924).
50. S. 2930, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. § 16 (1924).
51. H.R. 5589, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. § 14 (1925). For a discussion of the origins of the
proviso, see Reston v. FCC, 492 F. Supp. 697 (D.D.C. 1980).
52. See supra note 46.
53. Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-
609 (1982)).
54. 48 Stat. at 1064 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1982)).
55. D. SIDDALL, UNAUTHORIZED HOME OVER-THE-AIR RECEPTION OF ENTERTAIN-
MENT PROGRAMS 7 (Cong. Research Serv., Library of Congress, January 5, 1982).
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the 1927 Act.56 Title II (governing common carriers) was adapted from the
Interstate Commerce Act.
5 7
The Act contained a new section 605, which provided:
No person receiving or assisting in receiving, or transmitting, or
assisting in transmitting, any interstate or foreign communication
by wire or radio shall divulge or publish the existence, contents,
substance, purport, effect or meaning thereof, except through au-
thorized channels of transmission or reception, to any person other
than the addressee, his agent, or attorney, or to a person employed
or authorized to forward such communication to its destination, or
to proper accounting or distributing officers of the various commu-
nicating centers over which the communication may be passed, or
to the master of a ship under whom he is serving, or in response to
a subpoena issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, or on de-
mand of other lawful authority; and no person not being author-
ized by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge
or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or
meaning of such intercepted communication to any person; and no
person not being entitled thereto shall receive or assist in receiving
any interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio and use
the same or any information therein contained for his own benefit
or for the benefit of another not entitled thereto; and no person
having received such intercepted communication or having become
acquainted with the contents, substance, purport, effect, or mean-
ing of the same or any part thereof, knowing that such information
was so obtained, shall divulge or publish the existence, contents,
substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same or any part
thereof, or use the same or any information therein contained for
his own benefit or for the benefit of another not entitled thereto:
Provided, That this section shall not apply to the receiving, divulg-
ing, publishing, or utilizing the contents of any radio communica-
tion broadcast, or transmitted by amateurs or others for the use of
the general public, or relating to ships in distress.
58
The new section incorporated, with minor changes and no enlightenment,
the four clauses and the proviso first created in the 1927 Act. Because the
amendments to the 1927 provision were viewed as insubstantial, discussion
of section 605 in the reports accompanying the 1934 legislation is scant.59
56. S. REP. No. 781, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1934).
57. Id. at 2, 3.
58. 48 Stat. 1064, 1103-04, § 605 (1934).
59. S. REP. No. 781, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1934) notes that "Section 605, prohibiting
unauthorized publication of communications, is based upon section 27 of the Radio Act and
extends it to wire communications." Similarly, H.R. REP. No. 1850, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
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4. The 1968 Amendments
No further legislative modification of the statute was made until 1968,
when Congress enacted the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
(Crime Control Act).' ° Section 803 of the Crime Control Act amended sec-
tion 605 to delete references to wire communications from all but the first
clause and to authorize certain interceptions permitted by other provisions
of the Crime Control Act.61
The Senate Report accompanying this legislation stated that the modifica-
tion was "not intended merely to be a reenactment of section 605" but,
rather "as a substitute.", 62 While the "new" section 605 would "regulate the
conduct of communications personnel," the "regulation of the interception
of wire or oral communications in the future" would be governed by the new
chapter 119 of title 18 of the United States Code (i.e., title III of the Crime
Control Act).63
5. The 1982 Amendments
In 1982, section 605 was further amended by the Communications
Amendments Act of 1982 ' to remove amateur radio transmissions from its
protection. The amendment was precipitated by Reston v. FCC,6 5 in which
the plaintiff, James Reston, sought an order requiring the Federal Communi-
cations Commission to produce, under the Freedom of Information Act, re-
cordings of amateur transmissions between members of the People's Temple
cult in Guyana and their colleagues in San Francisco. The Commission op-
posed disclosure of the tapes contending that the transmissions were not
"broadcast or transmitted by amateurs or others for the use of the general
public" and thus were protected from disclosure by section 605.66 Reston
argued that all amateur transmissions were exempted from section 605 by
the last paragraph of the statute. Noting that the legislative history of sec-
tion 605 was "of minimal help in clarifying the ambiguity that plagues the
meaning of the phrase 'amateurs or others for the use of the general pub-
lic,' ,67 the court concluded that the more logical interpretation of the sec-
(1934) states that "Section 605, prohibiting unauthorized publication of communications, is
based upon section 27 of the Radio Act, but is also made to apply to wire communications."
60. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968).
61. See id. at § 803, 82 Stat. at 223.
62. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2112, 2196.
63. Id. at 2196-97.
64. Pub. L. No. 97-259, § 126, 96 Stat. 1087, 1099 (1982).
65. 492 F. Supp. 697 (D.D.C. 1980).
66. Id. at 701 n.3.
67. Id. at 707.
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tion, considering the actual phrasing and punctuation used, would exempt
only transmissions, whether by amateurs or not, that were "for the use of the
general public." 6 The Senate Report accompanying the 1982 amendments
explains that the proviso to section 605 was modified specifically to overrule
this holding.6 9
As amended by the 1982 Act, and as currently codified in section 705(a),7 °
the statute provides:
Except as authorized by chapter 119, title 18, no person receiv-
ing, assisting in receiving, transmitting, or assisting in transmitting,
any interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio shall di-
vulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect,
or meaning thereof, except through authorized channels of trans-
mission or reception, (1) to any person other than the addressee,
his agent, or attorney, (2) to a person employed or authorized to
forward such communication to its destination, (3) to proper ac-
counting or distributing officers of the various communicating cen-
ters over which the communication may be passed, (4) to the
master of a ship under whom he is serving, (5) in response to a
subpoena issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, or (6) on de-
mand of other lawful authority. No person not being authorized
by the sender shall intercept any radio communication and divulge
or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or
meaning of such intercepted communication to any person. No
person not being entitled thereto shall receive or assist in receiving
any interstate or foreign communication by radio and use such
communication (or any information therein contained) for his own
benefit or for the benefit of another not entitled thereto. No person
having received any intercepted radio communication or having
become acquainted with the contents, substance, purport, effect, or
meaning of such communciation (or any part thereof) knowing
that such communication was intercepted, shall divulge or publish
the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of
such communication (or any part thereof) or use such communica-
tion (or any information therein contained) for his own benefit or
for the benefit of another not entitled thereto. This section shall
not apply to the receiving, divulging, publishing, or utilizing the
contents of any radio communication which is transmitted by any
station for the use of the general public, which relates to ships,
68. Id.
69. S. REP. No. 191, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2237, 2246.
70. Section 6 of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, simply recodifies § 605 as
§ 705(a) without making any substantive modification to its language. See supra note 10.
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aircraft, vehicles, or persons in distress, or which is transmitted by
an amateur radio station operator or by a citizens band radio
operator.71
B. Judicial Construction of Section 605
1. Section 605 as a Rule of Evidence
As a sweater that has lost its form through overuse, section 605 has been
judicially stretched for more than fifty years to serve a variety of functions
and perform a variety of activities not likely envisioned by its authors. What
little illumination the legislative history provides indicates that Congress had
attempted to draft a confidentiality provision. When section 605 made its
maiden appearance in the courts, however, it was interpreted as a federal
rule of evidence.
In Olmstead v. United States,72 the Supreme Court decided that the tap-
ping of telephone wires and the use of the intercepted messages did not con-
stitute an unreasonable search and seizure under the fourth amendment.
Nine years later, however, the Court held in Nardone v. United States,7 3 that
section 605 prohibited the use of wiretapped evidence in a federal criminal
trial. Rejecting the government's arguments that the legislative history was
devoid of any evidence that Congress intended the statute to serve this pur-
pose,74 the Court concluded that the "plain" words of the statute mandated
its conclusion.75
71. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, supra note 10, at § 5(a) (to be codified at
47 U.S.C. § 705(a)).
72. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
73. 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
74. In fact, the government argued that Congress was presumably aware of the Olmstead
decision and, therefore, had specifically failed to enact bills that would have proscribed wiretap
activities. The Court acknowledged this in its opinion:
True it is that after this court's decision in the Olmstead case congressional com-
mittees investigated wiretapping activities of federal agents. Over a period of several
years bills were introduced to prohibit the practice, all of which failed to pass. An
Act of 1933 included a clause forbidding this method of procuring evidence of viola-
tions of the National Prohibition Act. During 1932, 1933, and 1934, however, there
was no discussion of the matter in Congress, and we are without contemporary legis-
lative history relevant to the passage of the statute in question. It is also true that the
committee reports in connection with the Federal Communications Act dwell upon
the fact that the major purpose of the legislation was the transfer of jurisdiction over
wire and radio communication to the newly constituted Federal Communications
Commission. But these circumstances are, in our opinion, insufficient to overbear
the plain mandate of the statute.
302 U.S. at 382-83.
75. We nevertheless face the fact that the plain words of § 605 forbid anyone, unless
authorized by the sender, to intercept a telephone message, and direct in equally
clear language that 'no person' shall divulge or publish the message in substance to
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Although the Court justified its decision as a technical application of the
language of the statute, revisionism soon began to set in and, in the second
Nardone case,76 Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court, held that section
605 prohibited the use not only of the wiretap evidence itself but also of the
evidence procured with the aid of wiretaps (i.e., "fruit of the poisonous
tree")." Reaching this conclusion, the Court determined that a narrower
reading of the statute
would largely stultify the policy which compelled our decision in
[the first Nardone case]. That decision was not the product of a
merely meticulous reading of technical language. It was the trans-
lation into practicality of broad considerations of morality and
public well being. . . . A decent respect for the policy of Congress
must save us from imputing to it a self-defeating, if not disingenu-
ous purpose.78
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit made an early
attempt to discern some distinction in the application and purpose of the
statute's different clauses in Sablowsky v. United States.79 At issue in the
case was whether the statute proscribed the use of tapped intrastate as well
as interstate telephone conversations in federal criminal trials. In concluding
that such use was proscribed, the court noted that omission of the limiting
phrase "interstate or foreign" from the second and fourth clauses of the stat-
ute was significant:
Thefirst and third clauses of Section 605. .. [which] deal with
acts prohibited to employees of communications agencies may be
considered to be part of regulation of the carriers as well as consti-
tuting a rule of evidence. . . . If the first and third clauses...
are intended to relate to a phase of regulation as well as to consti-
tute a rule of evidence, the limiting phrase "interstate or foreign"
placed prior to the word "communication" in both of these clauses
was aptly used by Congress to bring such regulation within the
power of Congress under the Commerce clause. Upon the other
hand the provisions of the second and fourth clauses of Section 605,
which upon their face purport to relate to all persons, do not relate
to the regulation of communication carriers and therefore consti-
'any person.' To recite the contents of the message in testimony before a court is to
divulge the message. The conclusion that the act forbids such testimony seems to us
unshaken by the government's arguments.
302 U.S. at 382.
76. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
77. Id. at 342.
78. Id. at 340-41.
79. 101 F.2d 183 (3d Cir. 1938).
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tute a rule of evidence in the purest sense.80
One year later, the Third Circuit's reasoning and holding was adopted by
the Supreme Court in Weiss v. United States :81
[E]ach clause of § 605 is complete in itself; . . . in the first and
third clauses, which deal with divulgence of messages by persons
engaged in receiving or transmitting them, the communications are
specified as 'any interstate or foreign communication,' whereas, in
the second and fourth clauses, which deal with interception and
divulgence of communications, the phrases used are 'any commu-
nication' and 'such intercepted communication.'...
The petitioners further urge that there is good reason for the
distinction in the phrasing of the clauses in § 605 since persons
employed by communication companies can distinguish between
interstate and intrastate messages which they handle, whereas, in-
asmuch as messages of both sorts pass indiscriminately over the
same wires, the intercepter cannot make a similar distinction and
the only practicable way to protect interstate messages from inter-
ception and divulgence is to prohibit the interception of all
messages.
82
This case constitutes one of the few times that any court, in applying the
provisions of section 605, has taken the time to analyze its different clauses.
In so doing, the Court was handicapped by the absence of any legislative
history and was forced to imply meaning where none was sufficiently evi-
dent. The Court indicated "[wJe cannot conclude that the change in the
wording of two of the four clauses of the section was inadvertent.
' 83
2. "Interception" Under the Statute
In Goldman v. United States,84 the Supreme Court had an opportunity to
consider what constituted an "interception." This case involved the admissi-
bility of a transcription of a defendant's telephone conversation that was
overheard by federal agents (with the aid of listening devices) from the next
room. The Court held that the transcription was not the product of an "in-
tercepted" wire communication within the meaning of section 605:
What is protected is the message itself throughout the course of
its transmission by the instrumentality or agency of transmission.
Words written by a person and intended ultimately to be carried as
so written to a telegraph office do not constitute a communication
80. Id. at 189 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
81. 308 U.S. 321 (1939).
82. Id. at 327-28.
83. Id. at 329 (emphasis added).
84. 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
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within the terms of the Act until they are handed to an agent of the
telegraph company. Words spoken in a room in the presence of
another into a telephone receiver do not constitute a communica-
tion by wire within the meaning of the section. Letters deposited
in the Post Office are protected from examination by federal stat-
ute, but it could not rightly be claimed that the office carbon of
such letter, or indeed the letter itself before it has left the office of
the sender, comes within the protection of the statute. The same
view of the scope of the Communications Act follows from the
natural meaning of the term 'intercept.' As has rightly been held,
this word indicates the taking or seizure by the way or before arrival
at the destined place. It does not ordinarily connote the obtaining of
what is to be sent before, or at the moment, it leaves the possession of
the proposed sender, or after, or at the moment, it comes into the
possession of the intended receiver.8 5
These principles were applied to radio communications in United States v.
Sugden.s6 Sugden, an Arizona cotton farmer, was indicted for concealing
and shielding illegal immigrants. Much of the evidence against him con-
sisted of transcriptions of shortwave broadcasts he made to his field hands,
which were monitored by an FCC field engineer."7 The court concluded
that section 605 proscribed the use of the transcriptions:
[I]t is to be observed that Section 605 nowhere within its own cor-
ners is designated as a rule of evidence. It has certain civil and
criminal significance by virtue of other sections of the Federal
Communications Act. It becomes, however, a rule of evidence for
federal courts by judicial construction. Further, Section 605 has
applicability to intrastate messages as pointed out in Weiss v.
United States ....
• . . [T]he very limited privacy which Section 605 gives the user
of radio for communication may tend to encourage the dispatch of
messages via radio over and above the use that would be made of
the means if personal messages were part of the public domain
available tomorrow, for example, for the commercial purveyor of
gossip.
While the telephone does have more privacy than private radio,
yet we think that the government agent who monitors cannot make
use of the fruits of his monitoring if he finds the station legally on
85. Id. at 133-34 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
86. 226 F.2d 281 (9th Cir. 1955).
87. Id. at 282. At the time the transmissions were monitored, the station was licensed but
Sugden's operator's license, while applied for, had not been received. Id. at 283.
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the air and the persons using the station legally authorized to oper-
ate it . ..
We think here that unless the Congress orders otherwise, the
exclusionary rules of Weiss and Goldman . . . are to be applied to
listening in (at least as a point away from the sender and receiver
and without the consent of either) on non-public broadcasts by
both private individuals and all public officers .... ..
In Rathbun v. United States, 9 the Supreme Court was asked to decide
whether Section 605 barred the admission of the contents of a telephone call,
overheard on an extension phone by police officers listening with the permis-
sion of one of the parties. The Court held that the statute did not bar the use
of the evidence:
We hold that Section 605 was not violated in the case before us
because there has been no 'interception' as Congress intended that
the word be used ...
The telephone extension is a widely used instrument of home
and office, yet with nothing to evidence congressional intent, peti-
tioner argues that Congress meant to place a severe restriction on
its ordinary use by subscribers, denying them the right to allow a
family member, an employee, a trusted friend, or even the police to
listen to a conversation to which a subscriber is a party ....
The clear inference [of the language of the statute] is that one
entitled to receive the communication may use it for his own bene-
fit or have another use it for him. The communication itself is not
privileged, and one party may not force the other to secrecy merely
by using a telephone.
Each party to a telephone conversation takes the risk that the
other party may have an extension telephone and may allow an-
other to overhear the conversation. When such takes place there
has been no violation of any privacy of which the parties may com-
plain. Consequently, one element of Section 605, interception, has
not occurred.9 °
Cases following Rathbun have held that section 605 does not prohibit the
admission of transcriptions recorded by, or made with, the permission of one
of the parties to the conversation. 9' In one of these cases, for example, the
Court held that obtaining and using such transcriptions in these circum-
88. Id. at 284-85 (citations omitted).
89. 355 U.S. 107 (1957).
90. Id. at 109-11.
91. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 413 F.2d 1226 (5th Cir. 1969); Rogers v. United
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stances does not constitute an unlawful search and seizure under the fourth
amendment because a person has no reasonable expectation that the person
to whom he speaks will preserve the confidentiality of his communication. 9
3. Cases Construing the Proviso and Defining "Broadcasting"
The wiretap cases discussed above involved receptions or interceptions of
transmissions that were point-to-point transmissions. Consequently, appli-
cability of section 705(a)'s proviso, which exempts transmissions "for the use
of the general public," was not in issue. In KMLA Broadcasting Corp. v.
Twentieth Century Cigarette Vendors Corp. , the applicability of this proviso
was in issue. KMLA owned and operated an FM radio station in Los Ange-
les and also transmitted, over a subcarrier frequency, a commercial-free
background music service to commercial and industrial subscribers for a
monthly fee. 94 The defendant purchased multiplex receivers capable of re-
ceiving the subcarrier transmissions and installed them for little or no charge
on the premises of establishments where its cigarette vending machines were
placed. The defendant had not obtained and did not seek KMLA's consent
to receive its subcarrier signal. KMLA commenced an action and the court
held that the defendant's activity violated section 605:
The question of whether KMLA's multiplex transmissions over
its subcarrier frequency constitute "broadcasting" so as to make
the protections of Section 605 inapplicable because of the proviso
• . . hinges on whether KMLA intended a dissemination of its
multiplex radio communications to the general public.
Here the parties have agreed that neither of the plaintiffs had or
has intent to transmit their background music program to the gen-
eral public. It has been held that Section 605 prohibits the inter-
ception and divulging by an unauthorized person of radio
communication not intended for the use of the general public or
not relating to ships in distress ...
The Commission over a long period of time has interpreted the
States, 369 F.2d 944 (10th Cir. 1966); Carnes v. United States, 295 F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 369 U.S. 861 (1962).
92. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (White, J., concurring).
When one man speaks to another he takes all the risks ordinarily inherent in so
doing, including the risk that the man to whom he speaks will make public what he
has heard .... It is but a logical and reasonable extension of this principle that a
man take the risk that his hearer, free to memorize what he hears for later verbatim
repetitions, is instead recording it or transmitting it to another.
Id. at 363 n.*.
93. 264 F. Supp. 35 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
94. The subscribers were provided special receivers, speakers, amplifiers, volume controls
and related equipment. KMLA serviced and retained ownership in the receivers. Id. at 37.
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statutory term "broadcasting" not to include transmission such as
here involved, and has in fact held that a radio station engaged in
broadcasting material of interest only to a particular person or per-
sons [here the transmission of background music is not intended
for the general public] is not broadcasting.
The nature of FM multiplex transmission negates any intention
that they be received by the public. Multiplex transmissions can-
not be received on conventional FM sets, since they are dissemi-
nated not over the main broadcast channel but over a subcarrier
frequency that can be received only with special equipment not
part of the ordinary radio receiving set. Multiplex operations are
specifically geared to the special requirements of commercial insti-
tutions, industrial plants, retail shops, and other subscribers
equipped with this special FM receiving apparatus. Fundamen-
tally, then, multiplexing is a point-to-point communication service,
directed to subscribers at specified locations.
The facts establish that FM multiplex transmissions of back-
ground music do not constitute broadcasting as that term is de-
fined in the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 153(o), and that the
unauthorized reception and use of such multiplex transmissions by
one other than an authorized subscriber is in violation of Section
605 of the Communications Act.95
Although the parties' stipulation, that KMLA's subcarrier transmissions
were not intended for the general public, made the court's discussion largely
superfluous, the court's analysis of the term "broadcasting" was inconsistent
with earlier judicial and Commission treatments.
In Functional Music, Inc. v. FCC,9 6 the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated rules prohibiting FM stations
from "simplexing" 9 7 background or "functional" music to subscribers on
the grounds that such a transmission was not "broadcasting" as defined in
the Act. To justify its rules, the Commission argued that presentation of
highly specialized program formats, the deletion of advertising from sub-
scribers' receivers, and the exaction of a charge to subscribers, dictated a
finding that the simplexing of a "functional" music service constituted point-
95. Id. at 40-42 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
96. 274 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied sub nom. United States v. Functional
Music, Inc., 361 U.S. 813 (1959).
97. "Simplexing" was a process through which a station would transmit one FM signal
capable of receipt by both the general public and subscribers and would supply subscribers
with special reception equipment which, when actuated by the transmission of an inaudible
tone, would delete commercial material. 274 F.2d at 545 n.4.
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to-point communication.98 The D.C. Circuit, however, disagreed:
[T]he Communications Act specifies that broadcasting is 'the dis-
semination of radio communications intended to be received by the
public . . . .' And program specialization and/or control is not
necessarily determinative of this requisite intent, and therefore dis-
positive of broadcasting status, as the Commission assumed.
Broadcasting remains broadcasting even though a segment of those
capable of receiving the broadcast signal are equipped to delete a
portion of that signal. In contrast to the objectionable service in
the cited cases, which by its very nature negates an intent forpublic
distribution, functional programming can be, and is, of interest to
the general radio audience. Petitioner [a Chicago simplexer], for
example, has acquired a high degree of popularity with the Chi-
cago free listening audience. Moreover, it receives substantial and
growing revenues from advertisers specifically desiring to reach
that audience. In this light, a finding that the programming of pe-
titioner and broadcasters comparably situated is not directed to,
and intended to be received by, the public generally is clearly
erroneous. Transmitted with the intent contemplated by § 3(o),
such programming therefore has the requisite attributes of
broadcasting.99
The Federal Communications Commission relied upon the Functional
Music rationale in support of its 1966 conclusion that subscription television
was "broadcasting" and that it therefore had the authority to allow STV
services to use frequencies allocated for broadcasting:
It might be argued that such programs (subscription programs)
are not 'intended to be received by the public' since their intended
receipt would be limited to members of the public willing to pay
the specified price. But, absence of any charge for the program is
not made a prerequisite of 'broadcasting' operations under the
present language of Section 3(o). And the reliance of the broad-
casting industry upon advertising revenue, rather than upon direct
charge to the public as its principal source of revenue, has not been
the result of any action by either Congress or the Commission, but
rather the result of the natural development of the industry. It
would appear that the primary touchstone of a broadcast service is
the intent of the broadcaster to provide radio or television program
service without discrimination to as many members of the general
public as can be interested in the particular program as distin-
guished from a point-to-point message service to specified individuals
98. Id. at 548.
99. Id. In KMLA, the court distinguished Functional Music by noting that the parties
before it stipulated that public dissemination was not intended. KMLA, 264 F. Supp. at 40 n. 1.
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. . . . While particular subscription programs might have a spe-
cial appeal to some segment of the potential audience, this is
equally true of a substantial portion of the programming now
transmitted by broadcasting stations.
[I]t may be observed that 'intent' may be inferred from the
circumstances under which material is transmitted, and that the
number of actual or potential viewers is not especially
important. 1o
Noting the District of Columbia Circuit's conclusion in Functional Music
that "broadcasting remain[ed] broadcasting" even though some persons re-
ceiving a signal were equipped to delete portions of it, the Commission
stated "[w]e believe that the reverse also holds, namely, that broadcasting
remains broadcasting even though a segment of the public is unable to view
programs without special equipment." '°
This definition of "broadcasting" influenced the decision in Orth-O- Vision,
Inc. v. Home Box Office.1 o2 Home Box Office (HBO), a program distributor,
had leased a Multipoint Distribution Service (MDS) channel in New York
and used it to transmit its programming for a fee to a number of affiliates
such as Orth-O-Vision, which, in turn, distributed the programming for a fee
to individual subscribers.1 °3 A series of contractual disputes brought the
parties into federal court, where Orth-O-Vision claimed that HBO had
wrongfully terminated Orth-O-Vision's contract and had conspired with
others to restrain trade in violation of the federal antitrust laws. °4 HBO
counterclaimed and alleged, inter alia, that Orth-O-Vision's continued distri-
bution of HBO's programming after termination of the contract violated sec-
tion 605.105 Denying HBO's motion for partial summary judgment on its
section 605 claim, the court held that its MDS transmissions constituted
"broadcasting" for the purposes of the statute: "The issue presented in this
case is whether the converse of the rule in Functional Music is also true:
does the transmission of programming which is of interest to the general
100. In re Amendment of Part 73 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations to Provide
for Subscription Television Service, .3 F.C.C.2d 1, 9 (1966) (emphasis added).
101. Id. at 10.
102. 474 F. Supp. 672, 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). But see Movie Systems v. Heller, 710 F.2d
492, 495 (8th Cir. 1982) (MDS transmission held not to be "broadcasting" within the meaning
of § 605); Chartwell Communications Group v. Westbrook, 637 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1980)
(same).
103. 474 F. Supp. at 675. Multipoint Distribution Service (MDS) is a single-channel, com-
mon carrier service used to transmit pay television programming to subscribers. The subscrib-
ers are equipped by the senders with specialized reception equipment to receive and decode the
signal.
104. Id. at 675-80.
105. Id. at 675, 680-81.
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public constitute 'broadcasting' even though one cannot view the programs
without paying a fee for special equipment?"'' 0 6 Discussing the FCC's ra-
tionale for its decision that subscription television (STV) constituted broad-
casting, the court noted:
From the factual record before the court on this motion for sum-
mary judgment, there is little to distinguish HBO's MDS transmis-
sions from those of STV systems. Both media involve the
transmission of radio communications that members of the general
public cannot receive without the installation of special equipment
for a fee. More significantly, HBO's programming, consisting of
recent movies, sports events and variety shows, differs little from
conventional broadcast fare and is obviously intended to appeal to
a mass audience.
One of the important circumstances from which HBO's 'intent'
might be inferred is the extent to which MDS facilities are techno-
logically capable of reaching the general public. The technological
limitations of MDS may be such as to render the analogy to over-
the-air subscription television inapt, but no such showing has been
made by HBO. Accordingly, HBO's motion for partial summary
judgment on its Federal Communications Act claim must be
denied. 
0 7
Three months before the Orth-O-Vision decision, another court reached a
different conclusion in a similar contract dispute between HBO and another
New York City affiliate, Pay TV of Greater New York:
Defendant does not deny that Section 605 prohibits an unau-
thorized person from intercepting the signals carrying plaintiff's
program service. The wording of the section proscribes the inter-
ception and use of such signals not intended for broadcast to the
general public ...
Here the multipoint distribution service station operates on mi-
crowave radio frequencies of such height that the signal is not re-
ceivable by conventional television sets until it is modulated by
special equipment. The programs are thus intended to be received
not by 'the general public,' but only by paying subscribers.'0
The principal distinction between the two cases appears to be that, in Pay
TV, the affiliate did not contend that the MDS transmissions were "for the
106. Id. at 681-82.
107. Id. at 682 (citations omitted). The court did conclude, however, that Orth-O-Vision
was infringing HBO's copyrights and granted its motion for summary judgment and perma-
nent injunction on that basis. Id. at 687.
108. Home Box Office v. Pay TV, 467 F. Supp. 525, 528 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (emphasis added)
(citations omitted).
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use of the general public" but rather, conceded the applicability of the stat-
ute and relied upon a defense that HBO had consented to its redistributions.
The applicability of section 605 to over-the-air subscription television
(STV) was at issue in National Subscription Television v. S & H TV.109
There, the plaintiffs that transmitted a program service in scrambled form
over UHF channel 52 in Los Angeles brought an action against several retail
electronic outlets that sold components, plans, and schematics designed to
facilitate the decoding of the plaintiffs' transmissions. The United States
District Court for the Central District of California concluded that the en-
coded signal was "broadcast or transmitted . . . for the use of the general
public":
Plaintiffs' arguments that their signals are not intended to be re-
ceived by the public and are therefore not broadcast under the ex-
ception to Section 605 are unpersuasive. The crucial consideration
is whether the programming is of interest to a large segment of the
population. Program specialization or control are not necessarily
determinative of the requisite intent nor dispositive of broadcasting
status. Broadcasting remains broadcasting even though a segment
of those capable of receiving the broadcast signal are equipped to
delete a portion of that signal as in Functional Music, or to other-
wise decode it. Such programming can be, and is, of interest to the
general TV audience. 1 o
In reaching its conclusion, the district court was influenced by the FCC's
determination that STV constitutes broadcasting:
Unfortunately, the legislative history surrounding the exception
[to section 605] is uncertain and we are precluded from utilizing
the usual canon that the scope of a provision is determined by its
purpose. However, when faced with problems of statutory con-
struction, courts have shown great deference to the interpretations
given by the agency charged with its administration. Here, the
agency interpretation appears to exclude subscription TV from the
prohibition of Section 605 and places it within the proviso except-
ing it from application of Section 605.11
4. When Broadcasting is Not Broadcasting
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the
district court's determination in National Subscription Television and held
109. No. CV 80-829-LTL (C.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 1980) (unpublished opinion), rev'd, 644 F.2d
820 (9th Cir. 1981).




that STV transmissions did not fall within the "use of the general public"
exception to section 605:
[We] conclude that section 153(o) [which defines 'broadcasting']
does not control the reach of the proviso. The proviso does not re-
move all broadcasting from the protection of section 605, but only
communications broadcast 'for the use of the general public.' We
think that an individual might 'broadcast'-i.e., transmit a signal
over the airwaves with the intent that it be received by the public
within the meaning of section 153(o)-without such broadcasting
being for the use of the public within the meaning of the proviso.
For example, the operator of an STV service offers his product to
any member of the public willing to pay the subscription price.
Like any entrepreneur, the STV operator hopes that his product
becomes popular and is subscribed to by most, if not all, of the
public. Thus, the programming of STV is calculated to attract the
largest possible audience, and the method of transmitting STV is
premised on being able to accommodate widespread demand. It is
in this sense that STV is 'intended to be received by the public'-
i.e., 'broadcast'-under section 153(o).
Nevertheless, it does not follow that STV is 'broadcast. . .for
the use of the general public' within the meaning of the proviso.
Indeed, the manner in which STV operators such as NST attempt to
control their signals suggests the opposite. The visual signal is use-
less and the audio signal not receivable without special equipment
supplied by the operator. Moreover, without the capability of
monitoring program viewing through use of such equipment, it is
doubtful that any STV operation can survive as a viable commer-
cial enterprise. We conclude, therefore, that STV operators such
as NST broadcast their programming, not for the use of anyone
who is somehow able to receive their signals, but only for the use of
paying subscribers. 12
In determining that for the purpose of applying the proviso to section 605 it
could distinguish between communications that were "broadcast' and those
that were "broadcast for the use of the general public," the Ninth Circuit did
not break new ground. Five months previously, the Sixth Circuit reached a
similar conclusion on a similar set of facts in Chartwell Communications
Group v. Westbrook.113 In deciding that STV transmissions were protected
by section 605, the court distinguished "broadcasting" as that term had been
defined in Functional Music and by the Federal Communications Commis-
112. National Subscription Television v. S & H TV, 644 F.2d 820, 823-24 (9th Cir. 1981)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).
113. 637 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1980). See ON/TV v. Calumet Elec. Supply, No. 83 C4072
(N.D. Ill. 1984).
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sion in its STV considerations, and concluded that transmissions that were
"broadcasts" for other purposes did not necessarily fall within the exception
to section 605 protection:
For purposes of the proviso to Section 605 the crucial factor in
determining whether programming is broadcasting is whether it is
intended for the use of the general public. Although program con-
tent is a factor to be considered in making the determination, it is
not dispositive. Mass appeal and mass availability are factors
which weigh in favor of finding that a particular activity is broad-
casting. However, those factors may be negated by clear, objective
evidence that the programming is not intended for the use of the
general public. The fact that STV is transmitted in such a manner
that the signal is meaningless without the use of special equipment
negates a finding that STV is intended for the use of the general
public.
We think STV is not broadcasting intended for use by the gen-
eral public within the meaning of the proviso to Section 605.
There is no meaningful distinction between the communications at
issue in KMLA and those at issue here. We disagree with the con-
clusions reached by the courts in Orth-O- Vision and [the district
court in] NST, and hold that Chartwell's communications are pro-
tected by Section 605.114
In other words, broadcasting may be "broadcasting" for classification pur-
poses under the Commission's rules, but not "broadcasting" intended for use
of the general public for purposes of the proviso.
5. The Role of Signal Protection
In United States v. Westbrook,1" 5 the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan, in concluding that a transmission was not in-
tended for "the use of the general public," emphasized the fact that the
transmission was scrambled:
The Court in Home Box Office, Inc. v. Pay TV of Greater New
York, Inc., concluded, as I do, that subscription television does not
fall within the exemption in Section 605 for broadcasting transmit-
ted for the use of the general public. Noting that the signals are
'not receivable by conventional television sets until... modulated
by special equipment,' the court held that the subscription pro-
grams 'are thus intended to be received not by "the general public"
but only by paying subscribers.' The logic of this analysis incorpo-
rates the flexibility necessarily required of a statute designed to
114. 637 F.2d at 465-66 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
115. 502 F. Supp. 588 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
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promote, protect, and regulate technological advances in radio
communications.
The reasoning of the Pay TV decision recognizes the limited ac-
cess intended by STV broadcasters and in my judgment is a more
appropriate analytical approach than that which focuses on the
wide appeal of STV broadcasting.' 
1 6
In Home Box Office, Inc. v. Advanced Consumer Technology,117 HBO
sought to enjoin the sale of equipment designed for the sole purpose of inter-
cepting MDS transmissions of HBO in New York City. The court granted
injunctive relief and rejected the defendants' arguments that their activities
were not proscribed by section 605. In so acting, the court rejected argu-
ments that HBO and its MDS affiliate had not undertaken reasonable steps
to protect the signal from unauthorized reception; the court stated
"[c]ommercial television sets produced at this time are as yet incapable of
receiving MDS without supplementary equipment. So long as this is so...
HBO may reasonably assume that the ordinary, law-abiding citizen will not
unilaterally take steps to intercept MDS."' 1 The court recognized, on the
other hand, that:
HBO might face difficulties, for example, in enforcing section
605 against a manufacturer or purchaser of a television receiver or
other related device that enables consumers in general to receive
MDS among a wide range of previously designated 'point-to-point'
transmissions. Those difficulties need not now be examined, how-
ever. ACT, its President, and its distributors have knowingly
sought to sell the products at issue for the specific (if not the sole)
purpose of 'bootlegging' HBO's signal in the New York area. They
do not claim otherwise. The antenna involved is so designed that it
receives frequencies on which MDS is transmitted, and nothing
else. As applied to these defendants, therefore, and the product
they sell, the FCC's position is reasonable and clearly within the
purpose of section 605.19
In American Television and Communities Corp. (A TC) v. Western Tech-
tronics, Inc. ,120 ATC, an HBO affiliate leasing an MDS channel to distribute
HBO programming in the Denver area, brought an action seeking injunctive
relief and damages against the defendants who advertised and sold micro-
wave antennas, down converters and related reception equipment which ena-
116. Id. at 591 (citations omitted) (discussing HBO v. Pay TV, 467 F. Supp. 525 (E.D.N.Y.
1979)).
117. 549 F. Supp. 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
118. Id. at 22.
119. Id. at 25.
120. 529 F. Supp. 617 (D. Colo. 1982).
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bled purchasers to receive ATC's transmissions. The defendants did not
deny that they sold equipment that facilitated the interception of ATC's sig-
nal, but contended that its MDS transmissions were "intended for the gen-
eral public's use" and that ATC, as a "mere licensee" of HBO, had no
standing to bring the suit. The court rejected the defendants' standing argu-
ment and held that ATC's transmissions were within the protection of sec-
tion 605.121 In reaching its conclusion, the court was influenced by the fact
that MDS stations are classified as common carriers and by the mutually
exclusive categorization of "broadcasters" and "common carriers" in section
3(h) of the Communications Act.' 22 The court was also persuaded by the
reasoning of the Sixth Circuit in Chartwell and the Ninth Circuit in National
Subscription Television ' 23 that the financial survival of the operation in ques-
tion depended upon restricting the transmissions from general public use.' 24
United States v. Stone 25 involved a prosecution under section 605 of indi-
viduals engaged in the business of selling microwave antennas, down con-
verters, and components that enabled purchasers to receive MDS
transmissions. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the section 605
counts, arguing that "[s]uch an application has no support in the legislative
history of the statute; receiving an omnidirectional radio communication is
not the same as an 'interception,' finally, such communications should be
considered as being for the 'use of the general public' and thus exempt from
the prohibitions of the law."' 2 6 The court denied the defendants' motion,
finding that "[t]here is ample support in case law and in the legislative his-
tory of the statute to support an application of Section 605 to prohibit the
interception and subsequent disclosure of transmissions of a MDS sta-
tion."' 27 The court found defendants' argument that MDS transmissions
were broadcasting intended for the use of the general public to be
"nugacious." 28
In Movie Systems v. Heller,'29 an HBO MDS affiliate sued an individual
who had installed a microwave antenna and down converter to receive its
transmissions in his home without paying any fee. The Eighth Circuit af-
121. Id. at 620-21.
122. Id. at 619-20.
123. Id. Although Chartwell and NST involved STV, the court found MDS and STV to be
"analytically indistinguishable" for § 605 purposes. Id. at 620 n.4.
124. Id. at 620.
125. 546 F. Supp. 234 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
126. Id. at 236.
127. Id. at 240.
128. Id.
129. 710 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1983).
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firmed the district court's order granting the affiliate's motion for summary
judgment:
Although the content of HBO programming 'may be of interest
to the general public, access to that programming cannot be gained
with traditional television sets.' The MDS microwave signal oper-
ates at such a high frequency that the signal cannot be received
without the use of special equipment such as the microwave an-
tenna and the down converter. We hold that MDS transmissions
are not broadcasting for the use of the general public and thus Sec-
tion 605 prohibits unauthorized interception of the MDS signal. 3 '
6. The Recent Cases-Falling Asleep at the Tiller
Because so many of the recent cases brought under section 605 have in-
volved the unauthorized interception of MDS and STV signals, some courts
are beginning to consider as resolved the issue of whether the statute pros-
cribes such activity. For example, in Hoosier Home Theater, Inc. (TVQ) v.
Adkins,13 1 MDS affiliate TVQ brought an action under the statute against an
individual who assembled a microwave antenna and down converter from
standard electronic parts and used the equipment to receive, without permis-
sion, TVQ's signal at his home. The United States District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana summarily awarded judgment for the plaintiff
on the question of section 605 liability:
Applying the facts of this case to the Federal Communications
Act raises isues which are not novel and have been passed on in
substance by many other courts. . . . [T]he applicability of Sec-
tion 605 to unauthorized receipt and use of the MDS signal is con-
sistent with the holdings in the overwhelming majority of similar
cases. 132
Some recent cases have even suggested a degree of impatience and have
engaged in superficial analysis in considering defenses that have been raised
and rejected repeatedly. For example, as previously noted in United States v.
Stone, the defendants' argument that the intercepted MDS transmissions
were within the proviso of section 605 was rejected as "nugacious. ' 133 Simi-
larly, in Ciminelli v. Cablevision, Brookhaven Cable TV Service, 13 4 the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York summa-
rily rejected the argument that intercepted cable transmissions fell within the
130. Id. at 495 (citations omitted).
131. 595 F. Supp. 389 (S.D. Ind. 1984).
132. Id. at 397-98.
133. 546 F. Supp. at 240.
134. 583 F. Supp. 144 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
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proviso to the statute by noting that the cable systems transmissions "are
simply not intended for the use of the general public."
'1 35
This impatience has resulted in application of the statute to activities not
proscribed by its literal terms. As noted above, all references to wire com-
munications were deleted from all but one clause of section 605 by the Om-
nibus Crime Control Act of 1968.136 These deletions notwithstanding, the
court in Cox Cable Cleveland Area v. King,137 applied section 605 in a cable
theft-of-service case, holding that "[s]ection 605 prohibits the divulgement
or publication of wire communications that are not intended for the general
public." 138 Although this case was wrongly decided, it has produced off-
spring. In Ciminelli v. Cablevision, Brookhaven Cable TV Service, 13 9 the
court cited King in rejecting the argument that section 605 is not applicable
to the theft of cable television services. 4
The high water mark of judicial expansionism may have been reached in
the King and Ciminelli cases. This mark may be higher than most commen-
tators have anticipated, for it can be argued convincingly that section 605
never created a civil remedy in favor of persons aggrieved by its violation. In
Cort v. Ash, 14 1 the Supreme Court identified four factors to be considered in
determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not providing
one:
First, is the plaintiff 'one of the class for whose especial benefit
the statute was enacted' . . . . Second, is there any indication of
legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy
or to deny one? . . . Third, is it consistent with the underlying
purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the
plaintiff?. . . And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally
relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States,
so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based
solely on federal law?
142
In Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,14 3 the Court overturned a long line of
cases and clarified that the determination of congressional intent must be
accorded primacy:
135. Id. at 161.
136. See supra note 60. The only proscription upon the divulgence or use of wire commu-
nications remaining in the statute is contained in the first clause, which by its language applies
only to communications personnel.
137. 582 F. Supp. 376 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
138. Id. at 380.
139. 583 F. Supp. at 144.
140. Id. at 161.
141. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
142. Id. at 78.
143. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
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It is true that in Cort v. Ash, the Court set forth four factors that
it considered 'relevant' in determining whether a private remedy is
implicit in a statute not expressly providing one. But the Court did
not decide that each of these factors is entitled to equal weight.
The central inquiry remains whether Congress intended to create,
either expressly or by implication, a private cause of action.
1"
Reitmeister v. Reitmeister,145 a case that has been cited for the proposition
that section 605 created a private remedy, found only the first of the four
factors identified in Cort v. Ash. More recently, in Chartwell Communica-
tions Group v. Westbrook,' 46 the Sixth Circuit, presented with the opportu-
nity to apply the principles of Cort v. Ash and Touche Ross to section 605,
conceded that the language of the statute and its legislative history did not
support the creation of a private remedy, but avoided the issue by noting
that a remedy under the statute has long been implied by other courts.
147
Thus, despite its acceptance and its progeny, it can well be argued that, ap-
plying the principles of Touche Ross, the Chartwell decision was wrongly
decided and section 605 did not provide the basis for a civil remedy until its
amendment in 1984.
III. THE STARLINK CASE AND THE NEW LAW: SATELLITE
PROGRAMMING IS DIFFERENT
In Air Capital Cablevision, Inc. v. Starlink Communications Group, 48 two
Wichita, Kansas cable television companies sought to use section 605 as the
basis for enjoining a retailer from selling satellite dish antennas to consumers
residing in the cable systems' franchise areas. In granting a summary judg-
ment dismissing all of the cable companies' section 605 (new section 705(a))
claims, the United States District Court for the District of Kansas concluded
that because "[s]atellite dish equipment does not hook into a cable com-
pany's telecommunications network and pirate away or decode the cable
company's transmissions," the case was distinguishable from section 605
cases where "the offending equipment intercepted or decoded television sig-
nals that were originated by or retransmitted by" the complaining parties.149
Because the cable companies had no part in originating or retransmitting the
satellite signals that the dish antennas were capable of receiving, the court
144. Id. at 575.
145. 162 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1947).
146. 637 F.2d at 459.
147. Chartwell, 637 F.2d at 466; see Reitmeister, 162 F.2d at 691.
148. 601 F. Supp. 1568 (D. Kan 1985). The case was pending when the Cable Communi-
cations Policy Act of 1984 was enacted.
149. Id. at 1571.
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concluded that the cable companies "simply [had] no standing to claim vio-
lations under former § 605 of the Communications Act." 150
In reaching this decision, the court noted that the facts before it were
distinguishable from the facts in the cases applying the statute to intercep-
tions of STV or MDS programming:
The problems inherent in the case at bar, as originally filed
under former § 605, are largely a function of judicial attempts to
stretch the language of the 1934 statute to apply to the advanced
technology of the 1980's.
Numerous courts [have] held that the former § 605 prohibited
the manufacture, distribution, and sale of electronic decoding
equipment that enabled home viewers to intercept original trans-
missions or retransmissions by subscription television distributors,
cable television distributors, or other television programming
distributors ...
None of [those] cases involve the issue presented in the case at
bar: [t]he right to manufacture, distribute, sell, and use equipment
that enables a home user to receive the vast number and varied
character of television programs transmitted via satellite ...
This case involves access of the public to the large number of pro-
grams and information available via satellite signals by virtue of
technological advances.' 5 '
The growth in the use of home dish antennas has been explosive. Con-
gress' recent clarification of the legal rights of home dish owners promises to
spur even more growth in the future. Because the safe harbor provided by
Congress in section 705(b) does not encompass all potential uses of con-
sumer-owned dishes, it is reasonable to assume that courts, in the near fu-
ture, may be provided with opportunities to consider the scope of the new
law as amended.
In the Starlink case, the district court ended fifty years of judicial engraft-
ment to section 605.152 The Starlink court was the first to become sensitive
to the technological differences between satellite transmissions and commu-
nications that have received judicial protection in the past. If courts in fu-
ture cases do not follow this trend, and if they are too quick in rejecting
defenses previously raised without carefully reexamining the merits of such
defenses, their decisions could significantly hamstring activities Congress has
150. Id. at 1572. Standing to pursue claims under § 605 has always been limited to the
"senders" of the allegedly intercepted communications. See Goldstein v. United States, 316
U.S. 114 (1942); Reitmeister v. Reitmester, 162 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1979).
151. Starlink, 601 F. Supp. at 1570-71.
152. Id. at 1568.
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sought to protect and could seriously retard the development of one of the
most efficient and dynamic methods of mass communications yet developed.
IV. BOUNDARIES OF THE SAFE HARBOR
One limitation of section 705(b) is that the protection applies to the inter-
ception or receipt of satellite cable programming. Section 705(c)(1) defines
satellite cable programming as "video programming which is transmitted via
satellite and which is primarily intended for the direct receipt by cable oper-
ators for their retransmission to cable subscribers."
' 153
Not all video transmissions by satellite, however, may be defined as satel-
lite cable programming. Internal network programming feeds or closed-cir-
cuit teleconferences as well as nonvideo services such as radio programming
or teletext may be outside the scope of the definition. Additionally, because
the definition of satellite cable programming depends upon the "primary in-
tent" of its sender, it is possible that section 705(b)'s applicability to any
particular program service could vary over time, depending upon the
programmer's "intent" which, in turn, might be affected by fluctuating mar-
ket conditions.
Because "satellite cable programming" is likely to be provided on chan-
nels adjacent to those providing programming which may not be so defined,
a dilemma results. A consumer may be required to tune across a "forbid-
den" signal in order to reach a "safe" one. If he or she does so, has he or she
violated section 705(a)? If he or she is momentarily attracted by what is seen
on a forbidden channel and views it for a while before moving on, is the
violation "willful" and will he or she be subject to the heightened criminal
penalties imposed by section 705(d)?
Of course, an individual accused of liability under these circumstances
may argue that he or she has not "divulged" the substance of the intercepted
communication to anyone and has, therefore, not violated the second clause,
the "intercept . . . and divulge" clause, of section 705(a). The Supreme
Court has held that the third clause of the statute, which proscribes the un-
authorized "receiv[ing] . . . and use" of radio communications, applies only
to communications personnel. The clause, therefore, is not applicable to a
home earth station use. 14 Just as a football quarterback knows the differ-
ence between a "reception" and an "interception," the cable programming
sender can distinguish between intended and unintended receivers of cable
communications. The home earth station viewer is an unintended "intercep-
153. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, supra note 10, at § 5(c)(1) (to be codified
at 47 U.S.C. § 705(c)(1)).
154. See, e.g., Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939).
1985]
Catholic University Law Review
tor" and not an intended "receiver." He or she thus can be held liable, if at
all, only under the second clause of the statute, which prohibits only "inter-
ceptions" coupled with "divulgences." Despite its logic, this argument has
been rejected without explanation by some courts. 55 Indeed, most courts
construing the statute have tended to ignore the subtle differences in its
clauses and have applied the terms "intercept," "receive," "divulge," and
"use" interchangeably and without analysis.
Another obvious limitation of the safe harbor is that it protects only "indi-
vidual" reception of satellite cable programming "for private viewing." Will
a restaurant or bar owner with a dish antenna who allows his patrons to
view an unscrambled satellite cable program be liable under section 705(a)?
This activity does not appear to be within the safe harbor provision, but it
still may not violate section 705(a).
These questions and many others will surely arise as the satellite spectrum
becomes increasingly congested with senders and receivers of television sig-
nals. As the courts begin to face these issues, confusion and disarray may
result unless some logical interpretation of section 705(a) is finally developed
to provide clear and consistent guidance in its application to emerging
technologies.
V. TOWARD A COMMON SENSE APPROACH
Such an interpretation can be derived from the statute's language and its
judicial history: Any sender who transmits a radio communication under
circumstances that make its susceptibility to mass reception reasonably fore-
seeable, and who does not take reasonable steps to protect the communica-
tion from such reception, should be deemed to have intended the
communication for the use of the general public.
This assertion is consistent with the line of cases beginning with Chartwell
Communications Group, Inc. v. Westbrook,1" 6 which applied section 605 to
the unauthorized reception of STV programming:
Mass appeal and mass availability are factors which weigh in
favor of finding that a particular activity is broadcasting. How-
ever, those factors may be negated by clear, objective evidence that
the programming is not intended for the use of the general pub-
lic. . . . The fact that STV is transmitted in such a manner that
the signal is meaningless without the use of special equipment ne-
gates a finding that STV is intended for the use of the general
155. See, e.g., Hoosier Home Theater, Inc. (TVQ) v. Adkins, 595 F. Supp. 389 (S.D. Ind.
1984).




Similarly, courts applying the statute to the interception of MDS trans-
missions have been impressed by the fact that individuals who wished to
intercept the signals had to undertake deliberate actions with specially
designed equipment which had few if any "authorized" purposes: "the mul-
tipoint distribution service station operates on microwave radio frequencies
of such height that the signal is not receivable by conventional television sets
until it is modulated by special equipment. The programs are thus intended
to be received not by 'the general public' but only by paying subscribers." ' 8
While it is true that some courts have concluded that the statute cannot be
construed to require a sender to scramble its signal,' 59 courts have recog-
nized that they "might face difficulties" in enforcing the statute against the
purchasers of receivers or other devices that enable consumers to receive
unauthorized signals among a wide range of previously designated author-
ized signals.' 6°
Furthermore, imposing an obligation upon a sender to undertake some
reasonable effort to protect its signal when its susceptibility to mass recep-
tion can easily be foreseen would be fully consistent with the policies of the
Federal Communications Commission. As the FCC has stated, "it has long
been the Commission's view that the initial responsibility for signal protec-
tion should be on the signal originator who is in the best position to protect
the signal against unauthorized interception and use."
' 16 1
The requirement that a sender undertake some effort to protect its signal
when circumstances warrant should be imposed to limit liability under sec-
tion 705(a) whether the unauthorized interception resulting from the lack of
protection is individual or public, private or commercial. Unauthorized
public or commercial displays of copyrighted programming are proscribed
by the Copyright Act, which sets forth the full extent of protection Congress
has been willing to provide for program owners. 162 These protections will
157. Id. at 465.
158. Home Box Office v. Pay TV, 467 F. Supp. at 528.
159. See, e.g., Home Box Office v. Advanced Consumer Technology, 549 F. Supp. at 14;
United States v. Stone, 546 F. Supp. at 240.
160. HBO v. Advanced Consumer Technology, 549 F. Supp. at 25.
161. Michael Reynolds, 89 F.C.C.2d 450, 455 (1982).
162. If the courts continue to accede to the growing practice by copyright owners and
licensees of using § 705(a) to protect their interests, they will convert the statute into an ersatz
"copyright law" unhindered by the limitations and exceptions, such as the "fair use" excep-
tion, that Congress and the courts have seen fit to impose upon copyright liability:
'The general rule of law,' says Mr. Justice Brandeis, 'is, that the noblest of human
productions-knowledge, truths ascertained, conceptions, and ideas-become, after
voluntary communications to others,' free as the air to common use. The Constitu-
tion and Congress have made some exceptions to this general rule, by the patent and
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not be affected by the interpretation suggested. The suggested interpretation
will help to clear up the blurred distinction between protecting the owner-
ship rights in programming, a copyright function, and protecting the means
of its transmission, a section 705 function.
The interpretation suggested will promote the continued application of
section 705(a) as a useful tool to assist programmers in proscribing and pe-
nalizing activities all parties recognize as "signal piracy" without unfairly
and unreasonably circumscribing legitimate uses of revolutionary new com-
munications technologies. If the courts reject this interpretation and instead
adopt a broad application of the statute designed only to protect the narrow
interests of satellite programmers, they will be helping to retard the growth
and development of new technologies necessary to create and sustain new
markets for those programmers.
VI. CONCLUSION
The safe harbor created by section 705(b) provides a haven from judicial
tempests of the past. Whether this protection is permanent or merely the
eye of the hurricane will depend on future judicial interpretations. By
adopting a common sense approach and requiring all satellite programmers
to protect their signals, the courts can help to ensure that the tempests of the
future will be confined to teapots.
copyright laws. They have rewarded inventors and authors for their creativeness by
granting them monopolies for a limited time and under carefully fixed conditions.
The courts will be creating new and perpetual monopolies of their own if they enjoin
. . . appropriation of unpatented and uncopyrighted material. This they are prop-
erly reluctant to do.
Chafee, Unfair Competition, 53 HARV. L. REV. 1289, 1318 (1940). Section 705(a) has had a
long and varied life as a secrecy protector and as a rule of evidence. To turn it into a copyright
law would be unwarranted at this late date.
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